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ID318939
Call NumberIMF/WP/07/91/267535
Title ProperDynamic incentive and the optimal delegation of political
LanguageENG
AuthorEggertsson, Gauti
PublicationWAshington,  IMF,  2007.
Description35p   28cm
SeriesIMF Working Paper No .91
Summary / Abstract (Note)IMF WP/07/91--- WP/07/100
Price. QualificationGIPE Dep
Classification NumberIMF
Key WordsCareer concerns ;  Central bank independence ;  Elections ;  Delegation ;  Learning-by-doing ;  Insulation


 
 
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Accession#Call#Current LocationStatusPolicyLocation
267535IMF/WP/07/91/267535MainOn ShelfGeneral