| ID | 364021 |
| Title Proper | The optimal timing of procurement decisions and patent allocations |
| Other Title Information | Discussion Paper Series. Discussion Paper No: 97.08, July 1997 (Draft) |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Perry, Motty ; Vincent, Daniel R. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We illustrate by means of a dynamic research and development race that while at some points in the race social incentives and private incentives may coincide, at other points they may diverge - too many researchers remain in the race. We show that there is a mechanism which allows the planner to exploit the researchers' private information to determine when and to whom to allocate the exclusive rights to pursue the final prize. |
| `In' analytical Note | In Gross, Nachum T.: Herbert Samuel's Advisory Committee of 1919. [Discussion Paper Series. Discussion Paper No: A97.04, April 1997 (Draft)] Jerusalem. The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1997. |
| Key Words | Procurement - Decision Making ; Patent Allocations |