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ID363958
Title ProperA new self-enforcement criterion for extensive-form games
Other Title InformationInstitute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm. Seminar Paper No. 445, September 1989
LanguageENG
AuthorWeibull, Jorgen W.
Summary / Abstract (Note)This paper develops a new self-enforcement criterion for strategy profiles in finite games in extensive form.
`In' analytical NoteIn Holden, Steinar: Wage drift in Norway: a bargaining approach. [Center of International Studies, Princeton University. Research Monograph No. 438, April 1989] Stockholm, Sweden. Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1989.
Key WordsStrategy