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SERIZAWA, SHIGEHIRO (6) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   262301


Extension of "Voting by Committees" to a model with multiple co / Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka; Serizawa, Shigehiro   Article
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka Article
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Summary/Abstract Discussion Paper No. 315
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2
ID:   262306


Impossibility theorem in pure public goods economies with feasibility constraints: Voting by committees in non-rectangular feasible sets / Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka; Serizawa, Shigehiro   Article
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka Article
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Summary/Abstract Discussion Paper No. 316
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3
ID:   262221


Maximal domains for the existence of strategy-proof rules / Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka; Ching, Stephen; Serizawa, Shigehiro   Article
Ching, Stephen Article
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Summary/Abstract Discussion Paper No. 358
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4
ID:   262311


Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by commi / Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka; Serizawa, Shigehiro   Article
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract Discussion Paper No. 317
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5
ID:   262314


Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice function / Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka; Serizawa, Shigehiro   Article
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka Article
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Summary/Abstract Discussion Paper No. 318
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6
ID:   262171


Strategy-proof, individually rational and symmetric social cho / Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka; Serizawa, Shigehiro Dec 1994  Grey Literature
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka Grey Literature
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Publication Osaka, Osaka University, Dec 1994.
Description Composite Document
Summary/Abstract Discussion Paper No. 355
Standard Number GIPE.
Key Words Public Goods  Social Choice 
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G00014ISER/GL/94/355-/G00014MainOn ShelfNOT FOR ISSUERack1 Shelf1